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THE LIMITS AS TO EFFECTIVE FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
ALPHEUS T. MASON t
It is customary among economists to describe the employer-employee
relationship as "inter-group." Strictly speaking this phrase is not applicable
to American conditions. There are surprisingly few group relationships
in our industry, either on the side of employers or of employees. The
employer is one, personally or corporately, not a group. Furthermore,
despite strenuous efforts of employers, under NIRA,1 and of trade-unionists,
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, to organize their workers,
there are many employees still bargaining individually, and not collectively.
2
Under existing conditions, the work of establishing group relations in
American industry is like trying to build stone walls on the flanks of a
t A. B., 192o, Dickinson College; A. M., Ph. D., 1923, Princeton University; author of
ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAV (925) ; BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND JUDGE IN THE MODERN
STATE (1933) ; The Right to Strike (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 52; The Labor Decisions of
Chief Justice Taft (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 585; and numerous other articles in various
periodicals; Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
1. 48 STAT. 195, tit. I ('933), 15 U. S. C. A. §§707-712 (Supp. 1934).
2. In November, 1933, the National Industrial Conference Board made a nation-wide sur-
vey to determine the extent of collective bargaining under NIRA; 3,314 companies, employ-
ing an aggregate of 2,585,74o workers, with capitalization of $5ooooo or over in manufactur-
ing and mining, were covered. This survey showed 45.7 percent dealing individually with their
employers, 45 percent dealing through employee-representation plans and 9.3 percent dealing
through labor unions. For detailed results of this survey, see INDVIDUA4 AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING UNDER THE N. I. R. A. (1933), issued by the National Industrial Conference
Board, Inc.
A similar survey, made in May, 1934, did not indicate any great change from the situa-
tion in November 1933. This more recent investigation showed that the proportion of total
wage earners dealing individually with their employers had declined from 46.1 percent of the
total to 40 percent; the proportions dealing through employee representation had increased
from 44.9 percent to 49.6 percent, and the proportion dealing through labor unions had in-
creased from 9 percent to 10.4 percent. For detailed results, see INDrvIDUAL AND CoI.LEcTnr
BARGAINING IN MAY, 1934 (1934), issued by the National Industrial Conference Board, Inc.
The 1933 totals given in the second paragraph of this note differ from those given in the first,
because only 89.8 percent of the companies in the November survey responded in May, and it
was therefore necessary to recompute the November data for the companies that replied in
May in order to show exactly What shifts had occurred within this group of companies be-
tween November and May.
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volcano; the materials are there but not the foundation. Since these pre-
liminary fundamentals have yet to be established in American industry, peace
is a dream.
Other countries have approached this problem in a variety of ways.
Long before Mussolini and Hitler outlawed strikes and lockouts in Italy
and Germany, respectively, Australia had taken the bull by the horns and
set up a system of compulsory arbitration which prevented strikes. Canada,
the Scandinavian countries, and others, provided years ago for a compulsory
waiting period during which strikes cannot be legally undertaken. Mean-
while the government investigates the points at issue and attempts con-
ciliation.
It is extremely doubtful whether the Fascist and Nazi policy of punish-
ing unions for strikes and employers for lockouts, when these seem bad
to governmental agents, can be made to conform with British and American
principles of democracy. And once it is agreed that in a democracy govern-
ment cannot maintain industrial peace by sheer force, then voluntary agree-
ments between organized labor groups and employers' associations must be
encouraged. This, at any rate, has been the traditional British policy. In
pursuance of it England has enjoyed a degree of industrial peace far exceed-
ing our own.
For over a generation in England, wages, hours and working condi-
tions have been regulated and adjusted by industry-wide agreements between
trade-unions and management with arbitration playing a leading role. Con-
ceding that this democratic method is the one most congenial to our own
traditions, and that the evolution of our industrial relations seems likely to
lead ultimately to this same stage of development, it may be worthwhile to
consider certain points of contrast and comparison. Then, I think, we can
appraise recent legislation, such as the NIRA and the Wagner Labor Dis-
putes Act, more properly known as the National Labor Relations Act.3 This
discussion is confined to such historical and economic aspects of our indus-
trial relations as seem to have definite bearing on the efficacy of this legis-
lation.
By the generosity of the Social Science Research Council I was enabled
to spend the summer in England where I could observe the British industrial
system at close range. Though mindful of many factors in our history and
tradition that explain various striking contrasts, one discovers that there are
differences in trade-union techniques, in the attitudes of industrialists, and
in the scope and nature of governmental regulation. Consideration of such
differences may be of service in evaluating the governmental controls which
Congress has recently established in this field.
3. P. L. No. I98, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (935).
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Perhaps the most impressive difference between English and American
trade-unions is the greater numerical strength of the former, and this in a
country one-third our population. As early as 189o British trade-union
membership numbered twenty percent of the adult male wage earners; in
i919 the proportion had reached seventy percent, i. e., more than 8,ooo,ooo
workers. Though trade-union membership has declined considerably since
then, it still numbers about fifty percent of the working population.4 In
America, on the other hand, even with the stimulus and incentive furnished
organizing activity by the New Deal, trade-unions, including those not affili-
ated with the A. F. of L., have hardly fifteen percent of our wage earners,
or about 4,000,000 members.5  Of the 33,000,000 wage earners in the
United States at least eighty-five percent are still dependent for the protection
of their interests upon the benevolence of employers or the intervention of
government.0 There are, of course, many reasons for the comparative weak-
ness of American unions but the British strength is due, at least in part since
189o, to the organizing of their unskilled workers. One significant result is
that the processes of adjustment through agreement are functioning there in
nearly all industries; while in America negotiations between organized labor
and management have been developed in but a few lines. Only in industries
having strong labor organizations (e. g., railroads, construction and men's
clothing trades) are labor disputes here settled in a manner comparable with
British practice.
American unions are still predominantly "job conscious" rather than
"class conscious" and this makes them aim at exclusive membership; they
have signally failed to organize the mass of unskilled workers. The A. F. of
L. was able to evade this issue until the San Francisco Convention of 1934
where a resolution was adopted approving industrial unions in the mass
production industries. At first this was widely hailed as a "move to the
left", but since the resolution provided careful safeguards for craft jurisdic-
tion, certain persons doubted whether it represented anything more than
a concession to the unions recently organized in such industries as cement,
aluminum, and automobiles, wherein the A. F. of L. had made little or no
progress. The struggle was renewed at the fifty-fifth annual Convention this
year when John L. Lewis led a combative drive for integrated organization
of the mass production industries. He charged that the old craft system was
4. For details as to trade-union membership in England, see 3. H. RicHARDsoN, INDUS-
TRIAL RE.ATiONS IN GREAT BRITAIN (933) 42 et seq.; id., Appendix IV.
In 1935, trade-union membership had declined to 3,388,81o. See (Sept. I935) MINISTRY
OF LABOR GAzErTE 331.
5. For an able treatment of the organizing effects of NIRA, see McCabe, The Effects of
the Recovery Act upon Labor Organization (1934) 49 QUART. J. OF ECONOMICS 52. See also
Slichter, The Future of Trade Unionisn and Employee-Representation Plans (March, 1934)
PERsoxNqm SmEvIcE BulL.ErIN.
6. See LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT (Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. 1935) 24.
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responsible for unionism's failure to enroll more than 3,000,000 of the
nation's 33,ooo,ooo wage earners, but the craft unionists triumphed by
18,025 votes to 10,924.
Another point of contrast is that American unions are far less closely
knit than the English. There is in the United States no all-embracing organi-
zation such as the Trades Union Congress, which, since its founding in
1868, has gained more and more authority over its constituent parts. The
nearest analogue is the American Federation of Labor, but that body is by
its constitution denied any executive authority whatever over the federated
societies. Moreover, the A. F. of L. does not include nearly all our total
union membership; some of the most successful and powerful unions stand
aloof from the Federation.
7
Largely as a result of differences already mentioned, the bargaining
power of American trade-unionists is far less than that of the British. This
may explain why fixing wages and conditions of work by voluntary negotia-
tion, long the normal course of procedure over there, is still so strongly
resisted in America. Many of our industrialists claim absolute "right" to
bargain with individual workers, or groups of workers, and to do so free
from outside union or other "interference." This attitude was outgrown
in England at least a generation ago.8 The wide chasm that separates the
American industrialist's point of view from that of the English, may be
indicated by representative statements of leading business men in the two
countries. A distinguished English industrialist believes that " 'collective
bargaining' between highly organised negotiating bodies [trade-unions on
the one hand and associations of employers on the other] has become so
much the established usage that we take it for granted as if it were a part
of the order of nature." 9 Our contrasting attitude was stated recently by an
eminent American industrialist as to the then pending Wagner Bill-a
measure designed to impose collective bargaining upon employers by legisla-
tive fiat. "I would rather go to jail," he said, "or be convicted as a felon"
than abide by the provisions of the Wagner Bill.10
7. Id. at 23.
8. For a brilliant comparison of American and British Trade Unionism, see RAMSAY
MuIR, AMERICA THE Gouar (1927). Muir concludes that the American trade-union move-
ment stands where British trade-unionism stood fifty years ago-that is, before the rise of
unionism among the unskilled, and before the creation of the Labor Party. The attitude of
American labor leaders, such as Gompers and Green, resembles that of such English leaders
as Thomas Burt and Henry Broadhurst in the eighties of the last century.
9. Quoted from BRITAIN'S INDUSTRIAL FuTUR, BEING THE REPoRT OF THE LIBERAL IN-
DUSTRIAL INQUIRY (1928) 51. E. H. Gilpin, Director of Baker Perkins, Ltd., and member
of the Executive Committee of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry, endorsed the above statement
in an interview with the writer on August 3, 1935.
io. Arthur H. Young, Vice President of the United States Steel Corporation, in an
address accepting a gold medal in recognition of "outstanding and creative work in the field
of industrial relations." N. Y. Times, May 25, 1935, at I. The award was the Henry Lau-
rence Gault Medal of The Institute of Management of the American Management Associa-
tion.
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The American business man feels sure that in all labor relations he has
an absolute right to conduct his own business in his own way, free from
trade-union interference, and that this is a natural and constitutional pre-
rogative. What E. H. Downey said fifteen years ago in his introduction to
Hoxie's Trade Unionism in the United States,'. is still fairly representative
of our industrialist point of view:
"The business man's right to employ or discharge whom he will,
to set industry in motion or break off the productive process whenever
he sees his own advantage in so doing . . . [are] rights involved in the
legal conceptions of private property and free enterprise; . . . in sup-
port of them the business man can appeal to the courts, the police and
even the military arm of the state. A challenge to these prerogatives
of business enterprise is in some sort a challenge to the existing social
organization."
The author of the previously quoted Wagner Bill statement is a leading
advocate of company unionism. Now company unions exist in England too,
but there they play a very subordinate role. 12  There the works council or
company union does not supplant the trade-unions but continues alongside
of, and is supplementary to, them. Since there is no question as to the
dominant and exclusive authority of the trade-union to negotiate with em-
ployers' associations as to terms and conditions of employment, British labor
has taken a somewhat neutral attitude toward works councils. There is
nothing of the bitter hostility which is so characteristic of American labor
leaders and sympathizers, the reason being that works councils are nothing
more than local organizations comprising representatives of management and
of labor, for dealing with local conditions outside the scope of collective
agreements.
Equally fundamental are wide differences as to political objectives and
activities of British and American labor movements. Until 189o their aims
were much the same; both were limited to improving the material and physi-
cal condition of the worker, though neither ignored the importance of sup-
porting legislative candidates sympathetic with their interests. During the
last decade of the nineteenth century British labor went in for greater
activity in the political field. Rather than trust political representatives,
almost always chosen from the ranks of capital, to safeguard and promote
their rights in Parliament, British trade-unionists backed their own candi-
dates. A trade-union leader, speaking in 1894, used interesting and sug-
gestive language in urging this:
XI. (1920). The quotation following is at pp. xi, xii.
12. See in this connection, RicHAIDsoN, op. cit. stpra note 4, c. 5; C. G. Renold, Trade
Unions or Conpany Unions (1935) 29 SuRvEy GRAPHIC 432.
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"We must couple with trade-unionism political activity-in the
sense of having some controlling hand in the administration of justice
and the uses to which our national forces should be put in terminating
itidustrial warfare. The social problem cannot be solved by the invoca-
tion of the constabulary and the powder and shot of our soldiery. Can
we fairly expect the capitalists to make laws in the interest of the
workers? . . .So long as the workers of the country allow themselves
to be cajoled and led without volition in political matters, they will not
devise any form of government for the purpose of expediting legisla-
tion favorable to the interest of labor. . . We must realize sooner
or later that it willl be easier to fight the employer on the floor of the
House of Commons than by the blunt methods of strikes which entail
so much misery and suffering." 13
Trade-unionism not only entered politics but set out to destroy the
capitalist system and replace it by that of socialism. Since 19o6 the Labor
Party has had substantial membership in Parliament and on two occasions
(1924 and 1929) His Majesty summoned a trade-unionist to form a govern-
ment.
As early as 1885, certain American labor leaders envisaged similar gains
to labor from taking part in politics. In the Federation of Organized Trades
and Labor Unions of that year, Delegates Emrich and Bauer presented a
resolution calling for an independent labor party.14  Experience had already
proved that laws in favor of the working class could not be expected from
capitalist legislators; that it would never be possible to elect real representa-
tives of labor until the workingmen severed their connection with existing
parties and created one of their own. This resolution was defeated, as all
subsequent proposals for independent political action have been.
Samuel Gompers, whether for good or ill, held that the true field of
trade-unionism was exclusively industrial, and he resisted strongly all
attempts to form an independent labor party." This policy was bitterly
criticised, but without effect, as recently as the A. F. of L. conventions of
1934 and 1935.6 The Federation still clings to its tradition of "rewarding
13. An Appeal to Trade Unionists for Political Action, an address by President J. H.
Beever to the Halifax Trade and Labor Council, Feb. 28, 1894.
14. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF i885, 17. For an able discussion of the damag-
ing effects of labor's refusal to present a united front in politics, see ROBERT HUNTER, LABOR
IN POLITICS (I915).
15. On the political and labor philosophy of Gompers in particular and the Amercan
labor movement generally, see his autobiography, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR
(1925) ; L. S. REED, THE LABOR PHLosOPHI3 OF SAMUEL GomnPas (1930) ; W. F. W~a-
LING, AMERICAN LABOR AND AmUCAN DEmoCRA Y (1926) ; MoLT R. CARROLL, LABOR AND
POLITICS (923).
x6. See REPORT OF THE EXEcUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR
(934). Proponents of resolutions calling for an independent labor party claim that had
they been submitted and considered on their merits rather than smothered by parliamentary
tactics, the resolutions would have received approximately 7000 votes.
As these words are written new proposals for an independent labor party are being offered
in the A. F. of L. Convention at Atlantic City, N. J., but they are meeting the usual resist-
ance at the hands of American labor leadership. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1935, at 8.
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friends and punishing enemies" among the old parties. Gompers always
insisted, moreover, that the function of organized labor was not to remake
society but by common action to secure for its members higher wages and
the best conditions that actual productive power allowed. Rather than
foster class consciousness, labor leadership has held out to the workers the
prospect that they themselves might ultimately become capitalists and em-
ployers of labor.17  The American worker has never thought of himself
as different from his "boss" save as to income. This conservative or "fron-
tier" policy continues under the leadership of William Green. Judging from
the red-baiting in which Mr. Green has recently indulged, a politically radical
laborite has about as much chance of access to the councils of the A. F. of L.
as a Communist has of being enrolled by Jouett Shouse in the American
Liberty League! 18
Under trade-unionism which enrolls the unskilled and enjoys unified
executive control and administration, with responsible leadership free from
graft and rackets, with a political policy which places its own men in political
positions where they not only safeguard labor against legal and political
encroachments but also may lay the foundations for socialist society, the
prestige of British labor is the envy of all other trade-unionists, and England
has achieved a measure of industrial peace which will not be ours for a
generation-if then.
This happier situation has resulted from the combined efforts of trade-
unions and governments. Following widely divergent policies, both Ameri-
can and British labor have worked to achieve two main objectives: improve-
ment in the legal status of trade-unions and social legislation for the material
and physical benefit of the entire working population. In England credit
for what so far has been achieved must go to organized labor, not to govern-
ment. Such assistance as government has rendered in improving trade-
union legal status has been corrective and supplementary; in this respect only
17. For an interesting discussion of the differences between American trade unionism
and socialism in terms of social and political philosophy, see THE DOuBLE EDGE OF LABOR'S
SwoRD, DiscussioN AND TESTIMONY ON SocILIasM AND TRADE-UNIONISM BEFORE THE COM-
MISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1912).
Both employers and labor have, as it appears, deliberately accentuated the already natural
conservatism of American labor. The contributions of the management in this direction have
taken the form of profit sharing, distribution of stock among employees, etc. The motives
are obvious: companies sponsoring these schemes desire to avert industrial unrest by making
their workers feel concern for the maintenance of dividends as well as wages.
Also, American labor itself has entered fields distinctly capitalistic, as in 192o when it
began to establish labor banks, investment companies, etc. Labor banks soon lost the last
vestige of class objective. Organized for the purpose of using labor's money as a weapon in
the struggle against capital, this notion disappeared when officers were confronted with the
necessities of practical banking. "We carry on our business," one official told the author,(,on strict banking principles. We do not allow ourselves to be influenced by sentimental
considerations."
I8. Drastic steps were taken at the fiftieth annual Convention of the A. F. of L. to purge
unions of Communists, or of any persons advocating the violent overthrow of American insti-
tutions. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1935, at i.
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may it be said that government has taken the side of labor in the industrial
struggle.
British labor, no less than American, has suffered from reactionary
court decisions. The four leading English statutes affecting the status and
activities of trade-unions were the immediate result of adverse judicial de-
cisions that outraged public opinion.19 One of these, the Conspiracy and
Protection of Property Act of 1875, relieved labor from the damaging effects
of the doctrine of criminal conspiracy by declaring that a combination of two
or more workers to do or procure any act in contemplation or furtherance of
a trade dispute was not indictable as a conspiracy unless such act would be
criminal if performed by a single individual. When George Ogder, in the
Trade Union Congress of 1876, labeled this enactment as "the greatest boon
ever given to the sons of toil", 20 he did not exaggerate labor's achievement;
the legal battles of American labor prove it.21  In this country the doctrine
of criminal conspiracy has always been, and still is, the legal thorn in the
side of organized labor. It has formed the legal base for thiat injunction
incubus so much heard of in America and so little known or used in England.
Injunction cases from the Debs decision of 1895 22 to the Daugherty-
Wilkerson broadcast of 1922,23 prove of what service this instrument is
to American employers in their legal battles against labor.
Despite the Act of 1875, British trade-unions were still subject to civil
liability for the acts of their officials, as shown by the Taff Vale decision
of 1901.24 In 19o6, when representatives of the Labor Party first sat in
Parliament, the ruling of that case was emphatically reversed by the Trade
Disputes Act which made trade-union funds immune from suit for damages
because of strike action, breach of contract, or otherwise.
19. I refer to the TRADE UNION AcT, 34 & 35 VICT. c. 31 (871), which declared, inter
alia, that the purposes of any trade union shall not, merely because they are in restraint of
trade, be unlawful so as to make any member of such trade union liable for criminal con-
spiracy; the CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT, 38 & 39 Vicr. c. 86 (1875) ; the
TRADE DIsPuTEs AcT, 6 EDW. VII, c. 47 (I9O6) ; the TRADE UNION ACT, 2 & 3 GEo. V, c. 30
(913), whose effect was to reverse the famous Osborne judgment of i9o9 (Amalgamated
Society of Ry. Servants v. Osborne, [191o] A. C. 87) which, if allowed to stand, would have
wrecked labor's political objectives.
20. SYDNEY WEBB, SIXTY YEARS OF THE TRADE UNION CONGESS.
21. The following cases may be cited as among the most famous: h re Debs, 158 U. S.
564 (1895) ; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (i9o8) ; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418 (igii); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917); Amer-
ican Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921) ; Bedford Co. v. Stone Cut-
ters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (927) ; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894) ; Toledo,
A. A. & N. M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1893) ; United States
v. Railway Employes' Dep't, A. F. of L., 286 Fed. 228 (N. D. IIl. 1923); International Or-
ganization v. Red Jacket Cons. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
22. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
23. See United States v. Railway Employes' Dep't, A. F. of L., 283 Fed. 479 (N. D. Ill.
1922) ; S. c., 286 Fed. 228 (N. D. Ill. 1923) ; 29o Fed. 978 (N. D. Ill. 1923). Both the Debs
and Wilkerson injunction orders are reprinted in full in FRANKFURTER AND GRERZrB THF,
LABOR INJuNCTION (1930) 253 et seq.
24. Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants, [19Ol] A. C. 426.
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The experience of American labor is sadly different. A federal Act of
1 8 90 ,25 originally intended to outlaw trusts and big business combinations,
embodied, according to the Supreme Court,26 language broad enough to
include labor activities.2 T And despite the pledges of national platforms,
Republican and Democratic, and the persistent effort to secure reversal of
the precedent established in the Danbury Hatters' Case in 19o8,28 that deci-
sion has never been overruled. The chief significance of the Sherman Act,
thus interpreted, is that it elevates the old common law doctrine of criminal
conspiracy to the status of modern federal law.
I have mentioned the English statutes as illustrating the sort of legis-
lation which Parliament has enacted to protect and promote collective bar-
gaining. It is significant, I think, that in no instance was legislation, profes-
sing to safeguard labor, drafted in such a way as to defeat labor's hopes.
So much cannot be said of American labor legislation; 29 indeed, some of
those very Congressional statutes on which labor based its fondest dreams
and to which it accorded unbounded praise, have either turned out abortive,
as were the labor clauses of the Clayton Act,30 or unenforceable, as was Sec-
tion 7 (a) of the Recovery Act.31 If American labor had had its own repre-
sentatives in Congress during the debates on the Clayton Bill I doubt whether
Mr. Gompers would have been deluded into thinking it anything other than
the gold brick it was. He actually called it the "Magna Charta of labor."
The one provision--denial of the conspiracy doctrine, civil and criminal, in
labor disputes-which, if included, might have entitled this legislation to
such high acclaim, was omitted. Congressman Hughes of New Jersey
set out specifically to copy the English statutes but was unsuccessful. He
finally had to admit that "there is nothing in this bill which goes so far as
that. . . . This legislation falls far short, in a federal way, of what the
British Parliament granted to its workingmen." 32
American labor has often spent its energies in efforts to attain such
delusive objectives as the sterile and sonorous words of Section 6 of the
Clayton Act: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce" 33-- a beautiful phrase of no legal force or effect.34  More re-
25. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890).
26. Lawlor v. Loewe, 2O8 U. S. 274 (I9O8).
27. For an examination of congressional intent and judicial interpretation of this Act,
see A. T. MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW (1925) 119-167.
28. Lawlor v. Loewe, 208 U. S. 274 (198o).
29. See A. T. Mason, The Labor Clauses of the Clayton Act (1924) 18 Am. PoL Sci.
REV- 489.
30. 38 STAT. 731, 738 (94), I5 U. S. C. A. § 17,29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (927).
31. 48 STAT. i98 (933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 707 (a) (Supp. i934).
32. 51 CONG. REc. 13972 (914).
33. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), I5 U. S. C. A. § 17 (1927).
34. Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U. S. 443 (921), Gompers observed regarding this useless bit of verbiage: "That won-
derful declaration, the first that has ever been made of the kind by any authoritative govern-
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cently labor has pinned its hopes on a legal guarantee of the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of its own choosing, as if
labor did not possess that right already, whenever and wherever strongly
enough organized to secure it. One looks in vain through the English stat-
utes affecting trade-union status for guarantees to workmen of the right to
bargain collectively and to be represented by persons of their own choice. I
am aware of no statutory provision, such as that in the Wagner Act, on
majority rule, or any conferring on a government agency authority to
designate the unit for which labor representatives can speak.
For one reason or another organized labor in England has also enjoyed
comparatively greater success in securing legislation for the general improve-
ment of working conditions. To appreciate what has been accomplished
along this line, one need only observe in the British statute books from 1871
onward, how government has taken over, one after another, functions for-
merly exercised by trade-unions. We note that old-age pensions have re-
placed or supplemented trade-union super-annuation allowances, that health
insurance has replaced or supplemented trade-union sick benefits, and so on
as to workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance, hours of work,
wages and conditions of employment, etc. In our own country it was not
until Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal that any considerable amount of
federal legislation was enacted to secure these elementary and extremely
important social ends. So when the editor of The London Spectator 3 5
commented not long ago that much of the New Deal social program as em-
bodied in NRA (and as since established in the Social Security legislation 11)
represents an attempt to catch up with English reforms that go back twenty
years and more, he was merely telling the bitter truth.
In our industrial relations, the intervention of government agencies on
the labor side, as provided under Section 7 (a) and in the Wagner Act, is
a new departure. We are more accustomed to the use of government power
on the side of the employer, in the form of injunctions, damage suits, militia-
men and soldiers. The frequency and ineffectiveness of labor's appeals to
government during the last two years raise doubt as to the usefulness of such
appeals. It also demonstrates labor's failure to see that only through its own
efforts can it hope to obtain permanent results.
Section 7 (a) of the Recovery Act attempted to improve the position
of labor in two ways: it sought to place the legal status of trade-unionism
on a more secure footing, and tried to make national in scope certain mini-
ment in any nation of the world, that the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce, was so inspiring and so fully recognized, it was another emancipation, not by
proclamation, but by solemn edict of the Government of the United States." Gom Eans ON
LABOR, THE COURTS AND THE LAw, published by the A. F. of L., June, 1921.
35. The Blow to the New Deal (1935) 154 THE SPECTATOR 909.
36. P. L. No. 271, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935).
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mum requirements as to hours, wages, and working conditions. The
Schechter decision " destroyed what was done in Section 7 (a) toward
improving labor's legal status; it set at naught the social accomplishments
of the Recovery Act; and also greatly narrowed the constitutional scope
of future legislation in both these fields. But long before this judicial
ukase, labor's expectations had been blasted by the wholesale manner in
which employers, without legal apprehension, flouted the provisions of the
Recovery Act.38  At the A. F. of L. Convention of 1934 the bitterest disap-
pointment expressed was over the failure of this Act to fulfill previous politi-
cal and legislative promises to throw statutory safeguards around the right
to organize and bargain collectively through bona-fide trade-union represen-
tatives. It is here, the Executive Council moaned, "that the most cruel
disillusionment of the workers regarding NRA has occurred." 39 So labor
leaders, during the last session of Congress, girded their loins and sought
to re-establish trade-unionism on a firm legal foundation. The Wagner
Labor Disputes Act resulted, the main purpose of it being to remedy defects
experienced in the administration of Section 7 (a). What were those defects
and how was correction to be made?
After six months as chairman of the National Labor Board, Senator
Wagner optimistically assumed that vagueness of language in Section 7 (a)
was responsible for the refusal of employers to recognize the rights of their
workers.40  Dean Lloyd K. Garrison, first chairman of the National Labor
Relations Board, while agreeing that the language of the Act needed clarifi-
cation, pointed out other shortcomings, saying, "I regard this whole problem
of providing effective enforcement . . .as of much more fundamental and
37. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (935).
38. After the decision of the National Labor Board in the Houde Engineering Corp. case
(N. L. B. Decisions, July-Dec. 1934, at 35, P. H. Labor & Unemp. Service 14,141) the
National Association of Manufacturers on September 11, 1934, issued a statement advising,
even urging, employers to disregard the Board's ruling and to continue "to abide by the long-
standing and authoritative interpretations upholding the right of minority groups to deal
with their employers . . . until competent judicial authority has declared otherwise."
The first judicial decision came on February 27, 1935, when Judge Nields of the United
States District Court of Delaware declared Section 7 (a) unconstitutional as applied to man-
ufacturers, on the ground that the "relations between defendant and its employees do not
affect interstate commerce." United States v. Weirton Steel Co., in F. Supp. 55 (D. Del.
1935).
In A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (0935), the Supreme
Court declared Section 3 of the National Recovery Act, 48 STAT. I96 (933), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 703 (1934), unconstitutional. This had the effect of nullifying Section 7 (a), since its pro-
visions were part of codes of fair competition under Section 3.
39. A. F. oF L., REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (October 1, 1934) 75. "Workers
who formed unions," the Report continues, "in good faith . . . found themselves dismissed
for no other reason than that they had accepted, at face value, the promises contained in the
law; company unions were created by employers to prevent the growth of real unions, and to
forestall real collective bargaining. Agencies set up by the N. R. A. for the enforcement of
Section 7 (a) were either unwilling or unable to enforce the law, or delayed so long in its
enforcement that unions concerned were weakened and even destroyed, and faith in this por-
tion of the act lost."
40. NRA Release No. 3414 (NLB), Feb. 21, 1934, P. H. Fed. Trade & Industry Serv.
1 8047.
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immediate importance than any changes in and additions to the language of
Section 7 (a)." 41 In the framing of the new Wagner Bill, care was taken
to remedy deficiencies of draftsmanship and of enforcement machinery.
Unfair practices of the employer are more precisely defined, though still not
without ambiguity.42 Enforcement machinery is strengthened by creating
a board with power to subpoena witnesses and records, and to make orders
reviewable and enforceable in federal circuit courts of appeal. Though
labor entertains certain fears and misgivings as to the outcome (particularly
if the new Labor Board should ever be manned by unsympathetic personnel)
so far as I am aware, not a single important item which labor leaders or labor
sympathizers deemed necessary as part of an effective statute, was omitted
from the Wagner Bill. We may therefore expect a reasonable degree of
success in its enforcement. Even before this Act received the President's sig-
nature, William Green hastened to laud it as another Magna Charta for
labor. (England, as I recall, had only one Magna Charta!) Despite such
hopeful portents, I venture to submit, in the light of British trade-union
technique and experience, that the new Wagner Act will fail of enforcement
at the strategic and vital point.
The big idea of this new legislation is to achieve for labor, by the aid
of government, the right of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is
made a legal right and several activities of the employers, condemned by
Labor Boards as illegal, are now expressly forbidden by specific statutory
provisions. 43 I am not inclined to quarrel with the Labor Board's numerous
interpretations of the collective bargaining provisions in Section 7 (a), 44
nor to question the design of the Wagner Act to render them effective, but I
do question whether the results will be as anticipated by the framers.
One can but deplore the manner in which certain employers sought to
defeat or circumvent the collective bargaining provisions of the Recovery
41. Garrison, Sectiolt 7 (a) and the Future (1935) 24 SURY GRAPHIC 53, 54.
42. P. L. No. 198, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (935) § 8. For a discussion of this feature of
the Act, see Wolman, The New National Labor Law (Sept. 1935) 92 REVmw OF REvms 3!.
43. The most significant and far-reaching of the unfair labor practices defined in Section
8 is that which appears in subhead (5) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer . . . To refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees .... "
Other "unfair practices" of the employer listed in Section 8 are:
"(I) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section 7." (Right of employees to organize and bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing.)
"(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organ-
ization or contribute financial or other support to it ...
"(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ...
"(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under the act."
44. For a scholarly analysis of the principles established under Section 7 (a) as a result
of numerous rulings of the two old Labor Boards, see SPENSER, CoLL~cnv BARGAINING
UNDER SEcTMON 7 (A) (935). A brief summary of these principles was published in pam-
phlet form by the A. F. of L., December, 1934.
CONTROL 'OF THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 289
Act.45  Prior to 1933 collective bargaining was a phrase of definite mean-
ing, known and accepted by both employers and trade-unionists. For both it
meant dealing through independent trade-union representatives and was
entirely distinct from any employer-employee relationship in which the com-
pany union, works council, or any other management employee representa-
tion plan was the device used. Nor was this distinction any more strongly
insisted upon by trade-unionists than by industrialists. The late E. K. Hall,
vice-president of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, whom
industrialists regard as the dean of their own school of industrial relations,
accurately expressed the labor point of view no less than that of employ-
ers: Trade-unions, Mr. Hall wrote in 1928, are organized "without invita-
tion from and often in opposition to the wishes of the management," whereas
the employee representation plan of labor organization, "is founded with the
encouragement and often on the invitation of the management; . . . it is
not bargaining; it is dealing; it is collective dealing, if you please, but as I
see it, that is very different from bargaining." 46 In the handbook of Infor-
mation for Employees distributed by the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey, the phrase collective bargaining does not appear prior to 1933.
As recently as 1932, John D. Rockefeller, 3d, advocated collective dealing,
not collective bargaining. 47 "More than sixteen years ago," observes an
official publication of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, "this com-
pany laid foundations for a new type of labor policy which afforded em-
ployees a method of collective bargaining." 48
The concepts "collective dealing" and "collective bargaining", which
formerly were quite antithetical as describing directly opposed types of
employer-employee relationship, became completely identified in the minds of
certain industrialists, after the enactment of Section 7 (a). "Collective deal-
ing", a phrase originally used to describe a relationship wherein the employer
deals with a labor organization which he himself had encouraged and spon-
sored, was replaced by "collective bargaining", a phrase alleged to meet the
requirements of legislative mandate. And it was then claimed that the two
45. For a telling story of the situation, see Beulah Amidon, SectioM 7 (a) (1934) 23
SURVEY GRAPHIc 213.
46. (Feb. 1928) 4 PERSONNEL 77.
The same point of view has been expressed by others: "Some employers now speak of
negotiations with their employes exclusively through the medium of shop committees, factory
councils, company unions, etc., as collective bargaining. . . . But to apply a term which
has been used for decades to connote dealings with an inclusive body of craft or industrial
workers having outside affiliations to dealings which are completely confined to one plant or
company not only is confusing but readily leads to a deception of both workers and managers
as to the basic difference between the two types of negotiation. . . . And, to apply the
phrase 'collective bargaining' to both types of transactions is to confuse the issues." TEAD
AND METCALF, LABoR RELATIONS UNDER THE RECOVERY ACT (933) 123, 124.
47. N. Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1932, at 23.
48. (April, 1933) THE LA P. Italics are mine.
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phrases had always been the same. In this easy fashion "old friends" ac-
quired "new names." 49
It is not my purpose to question the good intentions of those who helped
establish employee representations plans (particularly those antedating
NIRA) nor to deny the real benefits accruing to labor under them. For
most employers, however, and quite obviously, the motive prompting the
establishment of such plans was "good business." There was no thought of
endowing labor with any real right to bargain collectively. Before 1933 such
agencies did not constitute collective bargaining. No one said they did. The
industrialists said they did not. Only by some feat of legerdemain, as yet
unperformed, can these plans be now transformed, and I am convinced that
it was and is a mistake for employers to stage such magic.50
Some industrialists faced the situation more squarely and confessed that
their existing employee representation plans did not conform with the re-
quirements of NIRA. They then framed new schemes, admitting that the
effort was not made because the management "had a big heart", but because
"the law practically required them to do so." 51 There is grave doubt, as I
have said, whether employers can make the fundamental changes in company
unions needed to meet the requirements of true collective bargaining. This
is not to deny company unions all value and merit; they may serve a function,
as in England, 52 but to claim for them, as certain industrialists insist on
doing, the exclusive, or even dominant, position as bargaining agent, is tanta-
mount to giving the employer a representative on both sides of the table; in
which case labor's bargaining power is not curtailed; it is destroyed.
Closely associated with the Congressional purpose to aid labor in
securing the right of collective bargaining is the legislative guarantee of
authority to representatives of the majority to speak for all employees. The
issue of majority versus minority representation was a most troublesome one
49. See An Old Friend under a New Nave (Aug. 1933) THE LAiP.
5o. The attitude of mind in which industry undertook to meet the legal requirement of
collective bargaining through the device of company unions is found in the testimony of
Arthur H. Young, Vice-President of the United States Steel Corporation, at the hearings on
the Wagner bill.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Did you have any organization [labor] in these plants [Steel] prior
to last June [1933] ?
"ME. YOUNG. Practically none; no, sir; except our employes have good fellowship clubs
in nearly all the plants.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Has the passage of the National Recovery Act and the provision in
it known as Section 7 (a) led to the establishment of these organizations [company unions]
of your workers?
"MR. YOUNG. I should think quite definitely, Senator, that it precipitated the action
that had been under consideration and discussion for sometine prior to that." Hearings be-
fore Committee on Education and Labor on S. 2926, 736 Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 724. The
record speaks for itself ; it need only be added that the U. S. Steel Corporation has long been,
and still is, famous for successful resistance to the unionizing activities of labor. Italics
added.
51. Volante, Our Council Plan (Ist quarter, 1934) CO-OPEATION.
52. See, in this connection, C. G. Renold, Trade Unions or Company Unions? (1935) 24
SURVEY GRAPHIC 432, suggesting that company unions in America could be made to serve
much the same purpose as they do in England.
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under Section 7 (a). In one year, there was hardly a public official from
the President down who did not try his hand at a final and conclusive inter-
pretation, until the issue literally became confusion worse confounded.
53
The National Labor Relations Board unequivocally approved the majority
principle 5 and this ruling is given legislative endorsement in the Wagner
Act. 55 There can be little question as to the soundness of the majority prin-
ciple in our industrial relations. The right of labor to bargain exclusively
through representatives chosen by a majority of the employees is obviously
a right which labor should have, and employers should respect that right;
the reason given by them for not doing so is mere word-quibbling. Whether
Congress can or should undertake by law to fix majority rule for labor, is
another question.
Labor has maintained, and Labor Boards have endorsed, the exclusive
right vested in representatives of the majority to speak for all employees
within the unit "appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining." The
employers, in opposition, have shown surprisingly tender regard for minori-
ties, claiming for themselves as employers the "right", under the provisions
of Section 7 (a), to negotiate and make agreements with all comers. Never
before especially careful of minority rights, employers are now somewhat
absurdly solicitous, urging that it is unfair, undemocratic, un-American, for
minorities to be subjected to agreements which they have had no part in
making. The insincerity of such employer devotion to the minority principle
has been shown time and time again, the Guide Lamp Corporation Case 56
being a famous illustration. Hearing such argument in many labor cases
finally outraged Chairman Garrison:
"I am tired of hearing theoretical arguments advanced about the
rights of the minority. I have never yet seen a case in which these
53. For details see A. T. Mason, Labor, the Courts and Sectom 7 (a) (1934) 28 AM.
PoL. Sci. REv. 1OO3 et seq.
54. It re Denver Tramway Corp., N. L. B. Decisions, Aug. I933-March 1934, at 64, P.
H. Labor & Unemp. Service 14,J36.
55. Section 9 (a) reads: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer."
56. N. L. B. Decisions, July-Dec. 1934, at 47.
In October, 1933, the employees of this company began to join a labor union and sought to
negotiate terms with the management. The majority of the employees at that time belonged
to a company union. Declining to negotiate with the union representative, the company rea-
soned as follows: "If we begin the practice of negotiation with each group that presents it-
self, we will not be complying with the provisions of the N. R. A. . . . any negotiation or
collective bargaining must be with the committee representing the great majority of our em-
ployees." Quoted by L. K. Garrison, 7 (a) and the Future, (1935) 24 SuRVEY GRAPHIC 53.
In less than a year, the employees selected the outside union as their representative and then
the company declined to bargain exclusively with union representatives, arguing that both
groups must be bargained -with. In the ruling on the case, the Board stated the gist of the
matter as follows: "The company's insistence upon bargaining with the minority .
seems essentially . . . a reluctance to bargain collectively at all."
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arguments were advanced by bona. fide minority groups genuinely con-
cerned with negotiating a collective agreement applying to all. They
are invariably put forth by employers who do not wish to bargain col-
lectively and who, therefore, wish their responsibility to be kept as dif-
fused and uncertain as possible." 57
If only the employer could get the minority principle accepted, the rest,
in view of the chaotic and disunited condition of American trade-unionism,
would be easy. It is only necessary to have rival labor organizations present a
variety of demands so that by playing one against the other no collective bar-
gaining could possibly result. That the employer can do this to such an
extent that government is moved to intervene in behalf of the majority prin-
ciple, is a significant and discouraging commentary on the character and
strength of American labor leadership. If labor is ever to be intelligently
led and effectively represented, bargaining must be the exclusive right of
the majority. There can be no doubt as to that; the contrary view is un-
American and absurd. I have never known of a government sending two
sets of representatives to negotiate a treaty with a foreign country, one
authorized to speak for the majority, the other for a minority.
But even if accepted, the whole significance of the majority rule princi-
ple turns on the unit chosen. Under the provisions of the Wagner Act the
power and responsibility of deciding between competing units is conferred
upon the National Labor Board.-" I predict that the controversies under
this provision will be among the most difficult which the Board will be called
upon to decide, involving fierce battles between company unions and inde-
pendent labor organizations, and contests between craft and industrial union-
ists. Also, it may be that there are employees in American industry who
do not wish to be represented either by company or by outside unions, but
who do desire to avail themselves of direct even if sporadic collective bar-
gaining.59 How will the Board decide this issue?
In view of the delicacy of these questions, one may doubt the govern-
ment's wisdom in entering this field at all. The workers might better be
left to decide for themselves what unit they wish to have represent them.
For even conceding that a government agency can and should determine the
57. Garrison, supra note 55, at 56.
58. Section 9 (b) reads: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to in-
sure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bar-
gaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for pur-
poses of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or sub-division
thereof."
59. See in this connection Wolman, The New National Labor Law (Sept. 1935) 92
REVIEW OF REVIEWS 31. Wolman, formerly Chairman of the Automobile Labor Board,
argues that though the declared purpose of the Wagner Act is to diminish the causes of labor
disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce, its provisions are as well
calculated to stimulate such disputes as was Section 7 (a). In, the matter of enforcement,
Wolman predicts that that problem under national prohibition was "child's play" compared
with the difficulties that are bound to arise in connection with the administration of the new
labor law.
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bargaining unit, the problem will be next to impossible of solution in cases
where wage-earners have not already reached an agreement-a situation,
which as everyone knows, is not at all unusual. The wage-earners, thousands
of them, in a big modern plant are not in the least like a Yankee "town-
meeting." They have no community, often no common language.
Thus the desire of Congress to safeguard labor in its right to organize
and bargain collectively, has led it to assume responsibility even in matters
of a minor nature, details formerly considered as lying in the field of routine
shop management. Questions of seniority, discharge, lay-off, etc., all become,
under recent legislation, subjects of complaint and adjudication. If this
practice is continued paternalism may be carried to such a point as to suggest
fascism, and little reason will remain for the existence of trade unions of
any sort.
I submit that collective bargaining, as I analyze it, offers the most satis-
factory approach to the problem of the employer-employee relationship.
This requires strong, independent organization on both sides and adequate
adjustment or enforcement machinery competent to handle both of them.
The building of trade-union organization and power is the work of the
employees, not of government. Our brief experience under NIRA proved
government's inability to fight labor's battle. Only in those industries where
unions were strong before the enactment of Section 7 (a), such as the build-
ing and garment trades, have workers enjoyed any considerable share in
determining their. own destiny. In the unorganized or poorly organized
trades industrial strife continued with undiminished intensity, and employee
representation plans flourished.60
What, it may be inquired, are the constitutional limits within which
government may aid organized labor to build up the economic power of
unionism so that employees can bargain on a plane of equality with em-
ployers? In considering this question no attempt is made to discuss all the
constitutional issues likely to arise under the Wagner Act; rather my purpose
6o. For a statistical study of the growth of employee representation under NIRA see
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INDIVIDUAL, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER
N. I. R. A. (Nov. 1933) and INDIVIDUAL AND CoLLErcvE BARGAINING (May, 1934). For a
complacent statement of what was achieved for employee-representation under NIRA, see
E. S. Cowdrick, Collective Bargaining in 1934 (Feb. 1934) i3 PERSONNEL JOURNAL. "In
the field of employee representation", Cowdrick writes, "1934 was distinctly a successful
year. . . . The success of some of these plans has surprised even the friends of employee-
representation, to say nothing of those critics who sneered at them as last minute devices to
escape unionism."
A recent authoritative study of the extent and characteristics of company unions shows
that sixty-four percent of the unions covered were inaugurated during the period of NIRA.
MONTrLY LABR Rxvmv (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Oct., 1935).
In its report for the six months ending January 9, 1935, the National Labor Relations
Board declared that in thirty percent of the eighty-six cases heard by the Board, company
unions were a primary or attendant cause of the dispute. All but two of these unions were
formed or revived since the passage of the National Recovery Act. N. Y. Times, Feb. i3,
1935, at 33.
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is to examine certain judicial views, expressed in connection with earlier
legislation of a similar character. The Court declared not so long ago that
"where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of
facts, courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them
contrary to that reached by the legislature; and if the question of what the
facts establish be a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge
to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the lawmaker." 61
The "facts and findings" as to our industrial relations, set forth in Section i
of the Wagner Act, gain weight because of judicial endorsement given in
former cases.
Merely to declare in a legislative enactment the right of workers to
organize and bargain collectively adds nothing to the sum total of the legal
rights of labor. Labor has enjoyed all this as a matter of law since the
middle of the nineteenth century. What workers have not heretofore had is
legal protection against the discriminatory conduct of employers when they
seek to organize and bargain collectively. The important legal step made by
recent legislation is not, as many labor leaders seem to think, any legislative
declaration of a right to organize and bargain collectively, but rather the
legal safeguards thrown around labor activities designed to make these pre-
existing rights effective. That Congress has constitutional authority to insist
on such conditions as will give substance to labor's lawful rights, there can
be no doubt. Prior to 1925, a number of Supreme Court judges had ex-
pressed this view though always in dissent. In Coppage v. Kansas,2 three
dissenters, among them Associate Justice (as he then was) Hughes, took this
position. Arguing against a denial of due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment, and in support of legislative authority to declare the
policy of the state as to matters which have a reasonable relation to the
welfare, peace and security of the community, and to insist on the observance
of conditions necessary to make such a policy effective, Justice Day, dissent-
ing, said:
"In view of the relative positions of employer and employed, who is to
deny that the stipulation [making non-union membership a condition
of employment] here insisted upon and forbidden by law is essentially
coercive ? . . . Opinions may differ as to the remedy, but we cannot
understand upon what ground it can be said that a subject so intimately
related to the welfare of society is removed from the legislative power.
. It would be difficult to select any subject more intimately related
to good order and security of the community than that under consider-
ation-whether one takes the view that labor organizations are advan-
tageous or the reverse." 63
61. Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 294 (1924).
62. 236 U. S. i (1914).
63. Id. at 38.
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Justice McKenna dissented in a similar vein in Adair v. United States 64
where a provision of the Erdman Act of 1898,65 outlawing "yellow-dog"
contracts, was invalidated under the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. After declaring that the facts of history should not be overlooked, nor
the course of legislation, Justice McKenna said:
"We are told that labor associations are to be commended. May
not then Congress recognize their existence; yes, and recognize their
power as conditions to be counted with in framing its legislation? Of
what use would it be to attempt to bring bodies of men to agreement
and compromise of controversies if you put out of view the influences
which move them or the fellowship which binds them-maybe controls
and impels them-whether rightfully or wrongfully, to make the cause
of one the cause of all? And this practical wisdom Congress observed-
observed, I may say, not in speculation of uncertain provision of evils,
but in experience of evils-an experience which approached to the
dimensions of a National calamity. . . . how can controversies, which
may seriously interrupt or threaten to interrupt the business of carriers
. . . be averted or composed, if the carrier can bring on the conflict
or prevent its amicable settlement by the exercise of mere whim and
caprice? I say mere whim or caprice, for this is the liberty which is
attempted to be vindicated as the constitutional right of the carriers.
* . . Liberty is an attractive theme, but the liberty which is exercised
in sheer antipathy does not plead strongly for recognition.
. . .. . . . . . . . . . .
"What did Congress mean? Had it no purpose? Was it moved by no
cause? Was its legislation mere wantonness and an aimless meddling
with the commerce of the country? These questions may find their
answers in In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564.
"A provision of law which will prevent or tend to prevent the stoppage
of every wheel in every car of an entire railroad system certainly has
as direct influence on interstate commerce as the way in which one car
may be coupled to another, or the rule of liability for personal injuries
to an employ6." 66
Chief Justice Hughes went far toward reaffirming these views in 1930,
when he spoke for a unanimous Court in sustaining an injunction under the
terms of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 67 to protect the rights of labor
against the activities of a company union.68 The entire judicial history of
the Railway Clerks Case has such direct bearing on the scope of Congres-
sional authority in our industrial relations as to merit detailed consideration.
64. 208 U. S. 16i (igo8).
65. 30 STAT. 424 (1898).
66. 2o8 U. S. at 185-189.
67. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (Supp. 1934).
68. Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930).
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Since its organization in September, 1918, the Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks had been authorized by a majority of the clerks em-
ployed by the Southern Pacific lines to represent them in all matters relating
to their employment. Such representation, moreover, was recognized by the
Texas and New Orleans Railway Company; indeed any doubt as to the
status of the clerks' union as the bargaining agent was banished by the fact
that the management had been carrying on negotiations with it for years.
An application for increased wages had been denied, and the controversy
which ensued was referred by the Brotherhood to the United States Board
of Mediation. While this controversy was pending, the management under-
took to supplant the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks and substitute a com-
pany union. Pressure was brought to bear on members of the Brotherhood
to induce them to withdraw from their own organization and to make the
company union their exclusive representative in all dealings with the man-
agement. At this point the Brotherhood invoked the following provision of
Section 2 of the Watson-Parker Act of 1926: "Representatives, for the
purpose of this chapter, shall be designated by the respective parties in such
manner as may be provided in their corporate organization, or unincorpo-
rated association, or by other means of collective action, without interfer-
ence, influence, or coercion exercised by either party over the self-organiza-
tion or designation of representatives by the other." 69
On the basis of this provision the Brotherhood appealed to Federal
District Judge J. C. Hutcheson, Jr., for an injunction restraining officers of
the Railroad Company, inter alia, from interfering with the Railway Clerks'
right to organize and from displacing the clerks' union as the bargaining
agent of the workers. After a hearing following the issuance and service of
a notice to show cause, the court issued a temporary injunction on July 29,
1927. This order, made permanent April I9, 1928, in substance restrained
the railroad, its officers and agents from interfering with, influencing or
intimidating any of some 1700 clerical employees in the exercise of their free
and untrammeled right of self-organization. 70 The railroad and the other
respondents were also enjoined from interfering with the union's right to
select their representatives for deciding disputes between clerical employees
and the railroad company.
Evidence shows that officials of the railroad company paid little or no
attention to the court's order, whereupon counsel for the Brotherhood went
into court with about a hundred counts against the railroad for violation of
the restraining order. In the proceedings that followed, (wherein certain of
the railroad's officers were found guilty of contempt), the defendants chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Watson-Parker Act, relying on Coppage v.
69. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (Supp. 1934). Italics mine.
70. 25 F. (2d) 873 (S. D. Tex. I928).
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Kansas and Adair v. United States. But the court had no doubt that Con-
gress, despite the interference with freedom of contract, could constitution-
ally provide that in the settlement of disputes each side should be represented
by those of its own choice. Any interference with that right was held to be
enjoinable. "Upon a foundation," the court declared, "laid in direct viola-
tion of the statute, they [the railroad and its officers] have sought to erect
a superstructure of exclusive representation, and in the face of a statute and
an injunction designed to secure the observance of the fundamental maxim,
audita alteram partern, they have gone about to arrange it so that the railroad
would be in a position of surely having a vote on both sides of the table, its
own side and that of its employees." 71
Moreover, the court went so far as to imply that in view of the growing
demand for collective bargaining and the legislative and judicial recognition
which that right had received, together with the more liberal interpretations
given the phrase "liberty of contract", such cases as Coppage v. Kansas and
Adair v. United States might now be decided differently. Judge Hutcheson's
argument on this point is significant since his views are almost completely
embodied in the "findings and policy" of the Wagner Act:
"When, therefore, on either side of a dispute between an employer
engaged in interstate commerce, a recognized subject of federal legis-
lation, and its employees, one asserts, in the face of a statute which
puts conditions upon its exercise, that that particular form of liberty,
the liberty of contract, the right of the employer to hire and fire, and of
the employee to serve or quit, in the absence of contract (the most stub-
bornly asserted of all the particular liberties), is unrestrainable, he must
be prepared, not only to give learned dissertations on the freedom of
contract, but to show in the light of established practices employed in the
course of this long controversy, and of the judicial and legislative pro-
nouncements on it, that it has not behind it a sufficient force of general
public opinion to create an established custom which may be articulated
into law.
"If, in a study of the matter, a student of the law, employing in his
research induction and deduction, should upon examination find that,
rising at first slowly, and then, through the full realization of a common
plight, a common cause and a common remedy (the achievement of
group solidarity and power through unionization), rushing on tides of
feeling, the demand for collective bargaining became a passion with
workingmen, and that, begun more than a half century ago, this demand
has been asserted and opposed with equal fierceness, and at the cost not
only of the blood and treasure of the combatants, but of disturbances of
the public peace and prosperity, and that for the greater part of this time
this asserted right of collective bargaining has been enjoyed, he would
be an ignorant man indeed who would not at once conclude that such a
7I. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks v. Texas & N. 0. R. R., 24 F. (2d) 426, 433 (S.
D. Tex. 1928).
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pregnant struggle could not have been so long waged without giving
birth to customs, both capable of and in the interest of the public peace,
requiring judicature.
"He would not have been surprised to find the history of the
origin, growth, and change of such customs replete with legislative and
judicial pronouncements. He would find that, beginning more than 40
years ago, six times has Congress legislated directly upon the subject;
that in cases without number the courts have issued their injunctions
declaring and vindicating judicial power to protect the commerce of
the country from the anarchy and disruption arising out of these fierce
labor disputes ...
"He would find that in Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 167, a
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States had not been able
to see that the custom of balancing the concentrated power of the em-
ployer, on the one hand, by the concentrated power of the employee, on
the other, in negotiating wage and working agreements, which custom
the Congress sought in the interest of the preservation of the even flow
of commerce and the public peace to bring out of the field of mere
custom into that of the law, had so established itself as to become jus-
ticiable. But he would also find that others of the judges dissenting,
could not see how the 'liberty through sheer antipathy' to bring on a
struggle which would disrupt commerce could be paramount to public
interest and he could but wonder at least if this were not so." 72
From the decision of the district court, the railroad company appealed
to the United States circuit court where the judgment was affirmed.73 Here
also the court based its decision on the provisions of the Watson-Parker Act
quoted above. Counsel for the appellants argued that to give this provision
the effect of conferring on the employees of a carrier a judicially enforceable
right was inconsistent with the Court's decision in Pennsylvania System &
Federation v. Pennsylvania R. R.74  But Judge Walker, speaking for the
court, denied that this decision governed the case at bar. He said:
"Though under the Railway Labor Act, it is optional with carriers
and their employees to agree or not to agree to use the means provided
for by the act for the settlement of disputes, it is not optional with
either to violate rights conferred on the other by the act. The provision
in question indicates the unwillingness of Congress to provide machinery
for the settlement of disputes between carriers and their employees by
the voluntary action of the parties without at the same time providing
for the representative acting for each party in agreeing to a prescribed
method of settlement being one chosen by that party without interfer-
ence, influence, or coercion exercised by the other party. The violation
of a duty created by statute, resulting in damage to one of the class for
whose benefit the duty was imposed, confers a right of action upon the
72. Id. at 429.
73. Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 33 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A.
.5th, 1929).
74. 267 U. S. 203 (1925).
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injured person, though the statute makes no provision as to a remedy for
such a wrong." 75
The contention of the appellant that brought forth the most interesting
observation of the circuit court was that the injunction in this case violated
the anti-injunction provision of the Clayton Act in that it was not issued to
protect a property right.
"It may be assumed that that provision [Section 20] governs appli-
cations for injunctive relief by both employers and employees, though
there is some ground for concluding that in enacting the provision Con-
gress had in mind applications for such relief by employers only.
The term 'property right' is broad enough to include the right to
make contracts for the acquisition of property, by the rendition of
services, or otherwise, and the right of an employee to money or other
property exchanged, or to be exchanged, for his services. . . . It hardly
would be denied that injury to a property right of one would result
from keeping him from realizing as much income from his occupation
or business, though it consists in rendering personal services for com-
pensation, as he could have earned if his freedom of acting and con-
tracting had not been interfered with. We are of the opinion that,
within the meaning of the provision now under consideration, injury
to property rights of members of a group of employees would result
from conduct of their employer having the effect of such employees, in
dealings between them and their employer with reference to terms and
conditons of. employment, having a representative subject to the
domination or selfish influence of the employer, as a probable conse-
quence of employees being so represented would be their failure to fare
as well financially as they would have fared if they had been repre-
sented by a loyal agency intent on promoting their interests." 76
Far reaching implications of much importance to labor may be drawn
from this ruling. Employees have a financial, a property interest, in having
a representative to act for them free from the coercive influence of the
employer. This is a property interest, moreover, that is entitled, when
threatened, to equitable protection. Since the right to work is a property
right, and since the right to negotiate about work is also a property right,
both may be safeguarded by an injunction against blacklists, lockouts, and
other discriminatory conduct. It follows that whenever a company union,
as in the Railway Clerks Case, prevents the workers from faring as well
financially as they would when represented by their own organization, such
an agency denies them a property right which courts of equity will protect
against such infringements.
75. Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 33 F. (2d) 13, 16 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1929).
76. Id. at 17. Italics mine.
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When the Railway Clerks Case came before the Supreme Court, Chief
Justices Hughes used unequivocal language in sustaining the authority of
Congress to safeguard labor in its right to organize and bargain collectively
against the discriminatory conduct of employers.
"The legality of collective action on the part of employees in order to
safeguard their proper interests is not to be disputed. It has long been
recognized that employees are entitled to organize for the purpose of
securing the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with
employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of work. American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209.
Congress was not required to ignore this right [to organize and bargain
collectively] but could safeguard it and seek to make their appropriate
collective action an instrument of peace rather than of strife. Such
collective action would be a mockery if representation were made futile
by interferences with freedom of choice. Thus the prohibition by Con-
gress of interference with the selection of representatives for the pur-
pose of negotiation and conference between employers and employees,
instead of being an invasion of the constitutional right of either, was
based on the recognition of the rights of both." 77
Continuing, the Chief Justice observed:
"The intent of Congress is clear with respect to the sort of conduct
that is prohibited. 'Interference' with freedom of action and 'coercion'
refer to well understood concepts of the law. The meaning of the word
'influence' in this clause may be gathered from the context. . . . The
use of the word is not to be taken as interdicting the normal relations
and innocent communications which are a part of all friendly inter-
course, albeit between employer and employee. 'Influence' in this con-
text plainly means pressure, the use of the authority or power of either
party to induce action by the other in derogation of what the statute
calls 'self-organization'. The phrase covers the abuse of relation or
opportunity so as to corrupt or override the will. .... ", 78
Clearly one should not apply the Railway Clerks Case, however imposing
it may be as a precedent for Congressional legislation, to situations which at
first glance appear analogous. Of first importance is the fact that this case
involved a special statute. Furthermore, this decision can be used as a prece-
dent only in an industry where denial of the legal right of independent self-
organization would directly affect, burden or obstruct interstate commerce;
or where the organized power of labor is established, and where also there
is no dispute among the workers themselves as to who are their legitimate
77. Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 570
(930).
78. Id. at 568.
Johnson and Richberg in their statement of August 23, 1933, announced that the "rulings
of the Supreme Court lay down the law which governs the N. R. A.', and pointed out that
"the conduct of employers which is here prohibited has been defined in the case entitled T. &
N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548." N. Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1933,
at 4.
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representatives for purposes of collective bargaining. This case also leaves
unsettled the troublesome question as to who are the bona-fide repre-
sentatives in situations where there are divisions among the workers. The
Labor Boards have repeatedly held that persons chosen by the majority
constitute the exclusive representation of all workers within appropriate bar-
gaining units.79 This rule has now been embalmed in one of the provisions
of the Wagner Act,80 and a government agency is endowed in case of dis-
pute with power to decide which among the competing units is the one
"appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining." Mr. Justice Pitney's
observations in the Hitchman Coal Case cast some doubt on the constitu-
tionality of this provision:
"Whatever may be the advantages of 'collective bargaining', it is not
bargaining at all, in any just sense, unless it is voluntary on both sides.
The same liberty which enables men to form unions, and through the
union to enter into agreements with employers willing to agree, entitles
other men to remain independent of the union and other employers to
agree with them to employ no man who owes any allegiance or obligation
to the union." 81
The last phrase of this statement is overruled in both the Norris-
LaGuardia 82 and the Wagner Labor Disputes 83 Acts, and there is good
reason to believe that this outlawry of the "yellow-dog" contract will pass the
test of constitutionality. 4 This Congressional banning of anti-union con-
tracts is constitutional if it be regarded (as obviously it should be) as part
and parcel of the more general provisions guaranteeing the workers freedom
79. In) re Denver Tramway Corp., N. L. B. Decisions, Aug. 1933-March 1934, at 64,
P. H. Labor & Unemp. Service 14,136.
8o. Section 9 (c).
81. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 250, 251 (1917).
82. 47 STAT. 7Q (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 1O3 (Supp. 1934).
83. Section 8 (3).
84. No provision of the National Labor Relations Act is so well known in judicial his-
tory as Section 8, paragraph 3, making it illegal for an employer by means of employment,
"to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." The first enactment on
the subject was passed in 1898, 30 STAT. 424, 428 (1898), when Congress made it a criminal
offense for interstate commerce carriers to make a non-union contract with their employees.
This statute was declared unconstitutional in Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (igos), as
was a similar state enactment in People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1O73 (19o6), as an
arbitrary interference with liberty of contract. In 1917, the Supreme Court sustained an in-
junction to protect a "yellow-dog" contract against the organizing activities of a labor union.
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917). Despite the legal support
which the Court has given this noxious form of labor agreement, several statutes, passed re-
cently, declare such contracts contrary to public policy. Although the offending employer,
under this legislation, is not criminally ,indictable, he is denied access to a court either of law
or equity to secure enforcement of the contract. The first such statute was passed in Wis-
consin in 1929. WIS. STAT., c. 130, § 46 (1931). More than a dozen states have since passed
similar legislation. In like manner, the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932 declares the "yellow-
dog" contract opposed to public policy and prohibits federal equity courts from taking juris-
diction in suits brought to secure its protection. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § io3
(Supp. 1934).
The National Labor Relations Act goes further, as did Section 7 (a), and makes the
"yellow-dog" contract illegal and indictable. This legislation indicates the drift of public
opinion regarding this form of labor agreement.
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from interference, restraint and coercion by employers in the exercise of
their lawful right of self-organization. But other parts of Justice Pitney's
statement will doubtless stand the judicial test despite those provisions of
the Wagner Act that seem to invalidate them. For if collective bargaining
is not, as Mr. Justice Pitney says, bargaining at all unless it is voluntary,
those who remain non-union and constitute a minority are deprived of free-
dom of contract under a statute which forces them to accept conditions of
work as established by representatives of the majority.
One may experience even greater difficulty in seeking judicial precedent
for the much-discussed paragraph 5 of section 8 declaring it "an unfair
practice" for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with represen-
tatives of his employees." Precisely what does this provision require of the
employer? If it demands no more than a greater degree of congeniality in
his dealing with employees, that he merely sit and listen to the appeals of his
workmen, it is, obviously, of little value. Construed as a positive legal obli-
gation, its constitutionality is doubtful. If, in other words, this section re-
quires the employer, as the National Industrial Relations Board held under
Section 7(a), "to match their [union representatives] proposals, if unac-
ceptable, with counter proposals," 84a the Supreme Court will be likely to
interpose its veto.
84a. In re Houde Engineering Corp., N. L. B. Decisions. July-Dec. 1934, at 35. The full
statement of the Board on this point follows: "The right of employees to bargain collectively
implies a duty on the part of the employer to bargain with their representatives. Without this
duty to bargain the right to bargain would be sterile. . . . The employer is obligated by
statute to negotiate in good faith with his employees' representatives; to match their pro-
posals, if unacceptable, with counter proposals; and to make every reasonable effort to reach
an agreement. Collective bargaining, then, is simply a means to an end. The end is agree-
ment."
To the same effect the Board ruled in In re Eagle Rubber Co., N. L. B. Decisions, July-
Dec. 1934: Section 7 (a) imposed on the employer the duty "to enter into collective bargain-
ing negotiations with an open mind to match unacceptable proposals with counter proposals
and to exert every reasonable effort to reach an agreement binding for an appropriate term."
At p. 157.
In discussing section 8, paragraph 5, Dean W. H. Spenser follows the Labor Board's
construction of Section 7 (a). See his monograph. THE NATIONAL LABOR RmATIONS Acr
(1935) 21 et seq.
Quite a different construction is placed on this section by Professor D. A. McCabe, an
interpretation which makes it mean something to the workers and eliminates much of its
taint of unconstitutionality. He writes:
"What this clause really means is not that the employer must bargain 'collectively' (which
seems a contradiction in terms) but that he must not refuse to allow his workers to bargain
collectively with him if they wish. It is concerned with the form of bargaining on the work-
ers' side. To make it clear that the choice whether the workers shall negotiate collectively
now belongs in law to the workers and not to the employer, it prohibits the employer from
refusing to deal through the medium chosen by the workers, when that choice is the choice of
a majority.
"Obviously this statutory prohibition upon the employer does not insure the fixing of
the terms of employment by an agreement between the employer and his workers collectively.
The prohibition does not extend to a refusal by the employer to concede terms acceptable to
the workers. And the Act leaves the workers as free as before to refuse the terms offered
by the employer. It is concerned with the form of negotiation, not with the outcome of the
negotiations, with the establishment of the right of the workers to choose the channel of
negotiation regardless of the wishes of the employer, not with the securing of agreements."
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT (1935) 4-5.
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As every one knows, "liberty of contract" is not always so complete
that it may not be regulated to protect and promote the general welfare.
Circumstances have, in fact, justified Congress in protecting the public
interest against "injury resulting from failure to exercise the private right"
of negotiation and agreement between employers and employees as to wages
and hours.8 5 But it is doubtful whether government, under the above pro-
vision, can lawfully compel employers to negotiate and reach agreements
with their workers; constitutional support will be found wanting.
If this is to be done, the Court may have to endorse the proposition
that trade unions are public welfare institutions, and as such entitled to
legal and governmental sanction. Court opinions afford no support for
this; rather they point to the opposite conclusion. Trade unions, the Su-
preme Court holds, "are not public institutions, charged by law with
public or governmental duties, such as would render the maintenance of
their membership a matter of direct concern, to the general welfare." 86
Desirable as it is as a matter of policy, to establish collective bargaining,
labor cannot enjoy it even as a matter of law in cases where it does
not possess it as an economic fact. It is one thing for organized labor to
enjoy the right to bargain collectively in economic fact; it is quite a differ-
ent thing to gain such right as a gift from Congress. The attempt of govern-
ment (if made) to force agreements between employers and organized labor
is not very different from a statute outlawing strikes; both smack of com-
pulsory arbitration, and the compulsory method of dealing with the indus-
trial problem has found little favor with the Supreme Court.
7
Here a limit is reached beyond which Congress cannot and should not
go in its effort to equalize labor's bargaining strength. But it does not follow
that this entire realm of economic conflict is one in which judicial views as
to what is economically and socially desirable, should remain final and con-
trolling. If there are practical as well as constitutional limits to what Con-
gress caA do effectively in the industrial field, the jurisdiction of the courts
in the same area is even more narrowly restricted. It should not be neces-
sary at this late date to urge that "Congress, not judges, is the body which
should declare what public policy in regard to the industrial struggle de-
mands." 88 The language quoted is that of Justice Brandeis dissenting in
the Duplex Case. Continuing, he said:
85. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 353 (1917).
86. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. i, i6, V7 (915).
87. Compulsory arbitration involves extraordinary restrictions on liberty and property,
and if justified, even when used in public utilities and interstate commerce, it must be attended
by circumstances of an ominous nature. It required "a nation-wide dispute over wages be-
tween railroad companies and their train operatives, with a general strike, commercial paral-
ysis and grave loss and suffering over-hanging the country," to sustain the Adamson Act [39
STAT. 721 (i9i6), 45 U. S. C. A. § 65 (1928)], which, even then, "went to the border line"
of constitutionality. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 544,
544 (923), discussing Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (917), which held the Adamson Law
constitutional.
88. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 485 (1921).
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"By 1914 the ideas of the advocates of legislation had fairly crys-
tallized upon the manner in which the inequality and uncertainty of the
law should be removed. It was to be done by expressly legalizing certain
acts regardless of the effects produced by them upon other persons. As
to them Congress was to extract the element of injuria from the dam-
ages thereby inflicted, instead of leaving judges to determine according
to their own economic and social views whether the damage inflicted on
an employer in an industrial struggle was damnum absque injuria, be-
cause an incident of trade competition, or a legal injury, because in
their opinion, economically and socially objectionable." 89
In this process of establishing economic balance, government may aid.
Congress may declare labor's right to bargain collectively. If the federal
government may, without statutory authorization, appeal to a court of
equity, as it did in the Debs case, to protect commerce from imminent damage
and interruption, surely Congress can provide such precautionary measures
as will safeguard it from anarchy and disruption. In pursuance of this
purpose Congress can protect the workers against such discriminatory acts
as would render collective action a "mockery"; 90 it has already made "yellow-
dog" contracts both unenforceable and criminal. All this is within the
power of Congress both as a practical and as a constitutional matter.
The new labor legislation errs, as we have seen, in going too far, but
in certain respects it does not go far enough. Coercion and intimidation
by labor unions, whether directed against employers, non-union workers, or
the public, was not specifically forbidden by Section 7 (a), nor enjoined
under the Wagner Act. A suspicion that 7 (a) was somewhat one-sided
in this respect may have prompted the President, in his settlement of the
threatened automobile strike, to observe that "the government makes it clear
that it favors no particular union or particular form of employee organization
or representation. The government's only duty is to secure absolute and
uninfluenced freedom of choice without coercion, restraint or intimidation
from any source." 91 In the settlement of the Atlantic and Pacific chain
stores dispute, the National Labor Relations Board observed: "There must
be no coercion or intimidation by any of the unions to compel any man to
join a union." 92 All this might doubtless be said under the Wagner Act.
Defenders of the Act also point out that there was no need for specific
Congressional condemnation of the coercive and criminal acts of organized
labor since these are indictable under existing law. But conceding this to be
89. Id. at 485, 486.
go. Labor could make much greater use of the injunction in its battles against the em-
ployer. For a consideration of the effectiveness with which labor may itself appeal to equity
courts in labor disputes, see A. T. Mason, Organized Labor as Party Plaintiff in Injunction
Cases (1930) 3o CoL. L. REV. 466.
91. N. Y. Times, March 26, 1934, at I, 2.
92. Id., Nov. 4, 1934, § i, at I.
CONTROL OF THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 305
true, it is obviously preferable that legislation be drafted in such a way
as not even to seem to condone arbitrary conduct affecting employers, em-
ployees, or the public at large. Whether one's primary concern is for the
general welfare or for trade unionism, this failure to condemn unlawful
acts of labor is of doubtful wisdom. From English experience revealing
light is to be had on this aspect of the subject.93
Though the Wagner Act, as we have seen, confers power on the Na-
tional Labor Board to proceed against offending employers, no authority
whatever is granted the Board to take disciplinary action against labor unions
making arbitrary and unreasonable demands. A strike called to force com-
pliance with such demands is not forbidden since the statute expressly de-
clares that "nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with
or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike." 91 But organized labor
should be reminded that despite the far-reaching nature of the Wagner Act,
the doctrine of criminal conspiracy, as embodied in the anti-trust acts, still
stands. Because of this doctrine, labor objectives, however laudable in them-
selves, are rendered criminal whenever illegal means are used to reach them;
and means otherwise lawful may be criminal because of unlawful motive
or purpose. It was Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court,
who ruled:
"The right to carryon business-be it called libertyor property-has
value. To interfere with this right without just cause is unlawful. The
fact that the injury was inflicted by a strike is sometimes a justification.
But a strike may be illegal because of its purpose, however orderly the
manner in which it is conducted. To collect a stale claim due to a
fellow member of the union who was formerly employed in the business
is not a permissible purpose." 95
Whether the criticism is well founded that American unions are little
better than rackets, I am not in a position to say, but I do know that such a
belief exists and that it is widely held even in labor circles. The A. F. of L.
committee on racketeering, in a recent report to the executive council,
acknowledged its presence in certain unions and expressed willingness to
93. Encouraged by the legal immunities granted by parliamentary legislation from 1871
on, and especially by the hastily -drawn act of 1913 for dealing with injustices arising from
the Osborne judgment (see supra note I9), British labor in May, 1926, staged a general
strike of threatening proportions. The result was enactment of the reactionary TRADE Dis-
PUTES AND TRADE UNIONS Acr, 17 & i8 GEO. V, c. 22 (1927), which seemed at the moment
to jeopardize, if not destroy, legislative gains over'a period of fifty years. There was a shrill
outcry from the Labor Party that the act was an attack on the right of association and the
right to strike. Though this was never quite true, the general strike did lend support to the
argument in favor of a more restrictive labor statute, and conservatives seized this opportunity
to gain legislation for which they had been clamoring since 1913. The exact scope of the act
is undetermined, since it has not yet been subjected to judicial decision. Nevertheless, the
legislative efforts of labor are still directed to its repeal.
94. Section 13.
95. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 3o6, 311 (1926). For discussion of the constitutional
limitations of the right to strike, see Mason, The Right to Strike (928) 77 U. oF PA. L.
REV. 52.
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co-operate with the United States Attorney-General in efforts to stamp it
out.96 Until this is done, the attempt of organized labor to play a role in
the industrial process similar to that of British unions, will continue to be
embarrassed by the typical employer's retorts which might be put as follows:
That may be all very well in England. There labor unions are respon-
sible bodies, wisely led. They really represent the workers of the coun-
try. Ours represent only a few dissatisfied radicals organized by agita-
tors who are out to get something for themselves.
Certainly if employers are required by law to recognize labor unions,
then they are entitled to government protection against "radicals", rascals, and
racketeers. Requirement of the publication of trade-union accounts, audited
under government supervision, might in time eliminate many elements of
graft and racket. Other measures corrective of trade union abuses must be
found; but the remedy is not opposition to unions as such.
I consider both Section 7 (a) and the Wagner Labor Disputes Act, in
certain respects unfortunate. Such legislation is of value as a declaration of
the policy on the basis of which our industrial relations must be built. It rec-
ognizes that the relations between workingmen and employers of labor are
competitive in nature, that organized competition is not harmful, and that
the facts of our industrial situation make it necessary to restrict in certain
respects the rights and powers of employers so as to correspond in substance
to the powers and rights of trade unions. Insofar as the Wagner Act is
designed to safeguard the workers in their right to organize and bargain
collectively, free from the interference of employers, it is sound legislation.
This statute is defective in attempting too much; in entering conflicts that
do not admit of governmental settlement. It does not distinguish sufficiently
between the nature of government and the nature of an organized economic
group; it fails to differentiate sharply those functions which belong to gov-
ernment from those which must be left to trade unions.
I endorse collective bargaining as sound public policy but insist that
legislative fiat to achieve it is not enough. That industrial peace in a demo-
cratic society necessitates the right of labor to organize and bargain collec-
tively through independently chosen representatives, that such representa-
tive should be accorded the right to speak for all employees when constituting
a majority of the unit deemed appropriate, there can be no doubt. I seri-
ously question, however, whether it is the business of government to secure
these desirable ends in the manner provided in this recent legislation."
96. N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1935, at I, 2.
97. Something of the point of view here given is stated in L. K. Garrison's article, New
Techniques in Labor Settlemwnt (1935) 29 SURvEY GRAPHIC 159. ". . . I am certain that
any forward step in labor relations," Dean Garrison writes, "must be taken by industry and
labor acting jointly in the development of new techniques for adjusting their differences, and
that it is folly to expect too much of the government." At 199.
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In the industrial battle American labor has always depended too much on
government support and too little on setting its own economic house in order
and on organizing its own full strength. There is nothing in these recent en-
actments effectively calculated to correct this fault. If collective bargaining
is to be effective there must be the support of a strong, disciplined labor
movement under competent leadership; and so far, organized labor and or-
ganized capital, though surely hostile enough, have co-operated to abort this
result. Until strong, united and responsible organization is established on
both sides, governmental measures, such as Section 7 (a) and the Wagner
Act, will only serve to draw more sharply the issues as to trade-unionism
versus company unionism, collective bargaining versus individual agreement,
etc.; which result perilously exaggerates the elements of conflict already only
too inherent and apparent in the employer-employee relationship.
There is every reason to believe that a most important result of these
recent labor laws may be improvement in the operation of employee-represen-
tation plans. Employers are bound to try to bring their own plans into con-
formity with legislative requirements, and if they are able to do so, and if
they gain the support of a majority of their employees, the "Magna Charta"
of the A. F. of L. will actually have the effect of making it more difficult
for outside unionists to organize such plants.98 In view of this possibility,
even probability, it is hard to see why labor should be so optimistic about the
new Wagner Act, and equally hard to see why industrialists should be so
alarmed at the re-enactment of provisions which they successfully circum-
vented or ignored under NIRA.
It is evident, therefore, that the federal government cannot do much in
promoting collective bargaining until organized labor has first shown the
employer that the union exists, and perhaps the most convincing demonstra-
tion of such existence is ability to call out enough workers to bring the plant
to a standstill. Until a trade union is in a position to wage successful
battle of this sort, it is not in any position to bargain with the employer. Of
course this is not comfortable doctrine; and, furthermore, as long as there
are ten or twelve million workers unemployed, this entire discussion is
largely academic. The doctrine is, nevertheless, objective.
98. See S. H. Slichter's suggestive article, The Outlook for Labor Relations under the
Wagner Industrial Disputes Act (1935) 46 THE ANNALIST 78.
Professor Slichter overlooks the possibility of company unions getting out of hand and
freeing themselves of company domination. Events recently took this unexpected turn when
the company unions in the steel, rubber and automobile industries (all set up under NRA)
threatened to link up these individual plant company unions into national unions. Should
these unions get out of hand, the way will be clear for an independent unionism of unprece-
dented strength. Thus, ironically enough, the employers will have contributed to trade union-
ism that element of strength which labor leadership had until recently failed to supply. In-
dustrialists may now recall the warnings of General Hugh Johnson in 1933-that their feverish
haste in organizing company unions to circumvent the Recovery Act would react in the form
of "a Frankenstein that will ultimately override you." N. Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1935, § I, at 16.
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In the administration of the Wagner Act, or of any similar legislation,
the government may follow one of two policies, neither of which is likely to
produce the results desired. It may allow, as it did under Section 7 (a),
wholesale disregard of the Act's provisions; or, insist on strict enforce-
ment. The probable effect of the first course would be widespread industrial
disputes, and an appeal on the part of labor for an even more far-reaching
"Magna Charta." Should the administration adopt the policy of strict
enforcement, which is not at all likely, it might well be that the A. F. of L.,
in view of its lack of responsible organized power, and of its incompetent
and shortsighted leadership, would "go along" and become a meek sort of
government-run labor organization, in nature essentially and obediently
fascist. Neither employers nor workers intend such a result, but "the road
to hell is paved with good intentions", and both sides will have aided in
preventing the establishment of those foundations on which alone sound
industrial relations can be built.
